

PATRONAL NETWORKS IN BRAZIL: CASES OF ODEBRECHT AND JBS

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Abstract. This study examines two seminal corruption scandals in Brazil — that of Odebrecht and JBS — with a view to analyzing the functioning of patronal networks and their implications for the country's political and economic systems. The present study employs Henry Hale's theoretical framework to demonstrate how informal networks of economic and political elites perpetuate systemic corruption through mechanisms such as shadow accounting systems (*caixa dois*), offshore financial flows, and dedicated bribery departments. It is interesting to note that the Odebrecht case, which emerged from the Lava Jato (Car Wash) investigation, and the JBS scandal, appear to demonstrate how large corporations may sometimes find ways to institutionalize corruption in order to secure lucrative contracts, influence policymaking, and maintain political loyalty. It is evident from these cases that there is a symbiotic relationship between business and politics, whereby financial resources are exchanged for political favors. This has the effect of undermining transparency, accountability, and democratic governance. The study identifies three key mechanisms of patronal networks. Firstly, the use of shadow accounting to conceal illicit financial flows is identified. Secondly, the reliance on offshore accounts to evade detection is identified. Thirdly, the institutionalization of corruption at the level of corporations via the creation of specialized departments to manage bribery operations. It is evident that these mechanisms empower corporations to wield considerable influence over political processes, thereby perpetuating inequality and eroding public trust in institutions. The findings extend beyond the Brazilian context, providing a valuable source of insight for other countries grappling with systemic corruption and weak institutions. It is hoped that the paper will be of some contribution to the global discourse on corruption, by offering a perspective on the systemic nature of the problem and the need for comprehensive reforms. The integration of empirical analysis with theoretical insights is a distinctive feature of the present study, and it contributes to the advancement of understanding of patronal politics, corruption, and informal governance. The study offers a roadmap for addressing corruption and promoting democratic accountability in developing democracies.

Keywords: *patronal networks, patronal politics, the Odebrecht case, JBS case, mechanisms of patronal networks, corruption.*

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Introduction

Charles de Gaulle once said about Brazil: “This is the country of the future... and it will remain so forever.” This statement, in my opinion, very well describes Brazil — a country with great potential but also many issues of socio-economic and political nature, that stop it from moving forward. Brazil is a compelling case for studying political corruption as a resources rich country with big inequality and concentration of power. One of conceptual frameworks, which can help researchers to analyze this case is patronal politics, a system where economic elites and political actors merge together in what we call “patronal networks”, that is, informal networks build around exchange of resources.

In Brazil, patronal politics means that large corporations and wealthy people use money and connections to control the government. They do this through illegal financing, manipulation of bureaucracy, and corruption schemes. This phenomenon has proven to be detrimental for democracy because it makes political competition unfair

and keeps systemic inequalities in place. For example, according to Transparency International's 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, Brazil scored only 38 out of 100, which put it in 94th place out of 180 countries. This shows how serious the problem of corruption is in Brazil.

One of the most famous examples of this is the Lava Jato (Car Wash) operation, which started on March 17, 2014. Initially, the investigation aimed to dismantle a criminal organization involved in money laundering and crimes against the national financial system. However, by November 14 of that year, the operation gained unprecedented prominence when it uncovered the involvement of multiple government officials in corruption schemes. This marked a drastic shift in focus: while earlier investigations targeted private actors, the new focus turned to the public sphere, revealing a corrupt network that implicated various state actors. The Car Wash case became the largest media spectacle in the history of the Brazilian state, exposing corruption deeply embedded in the management of public affairs.

The goal of my research is to understand how patronal politics works in Brazil and how the connection between economic and political elites keeps this system alive. I will focus on three main questions:

1. What role do large corporations play in creating and maintaining patronal networks?
2. What methods are used to control political processes?
3. How does patronal politics work at different levels of government?

To answer these questions, I will use data from Lava Jato investigation, news articles, and reports from organizations like Transparency International. I think qualitative methods, like the ones Chatfield (2020) wrote about, will be very useful for understanding the relationships between politicians and business leaders.

This research shows how patronal politics makes inequality worse and weakens democratic institutions. For example, even though Brazil is the 12th largest economy in the world, it is also one of the most unequal countries. According to the World Inequality Database, the richest 1% of Brazilians earn 28.3% of the country's income, while the poorest 50% earn only 13.9%. This is not fair, and it is partly because of the corrupt systems that keep power in the hands of a few people.

Theoretical Framework: Patronal Politics

Henry Hale defines patronal politics as a system of politico-economic interaction based on informal relationships between patrons — individuals or groups with access to resources — and clients — those who depend on these resources (Hale, 2015). This system operates on an exchange principle: patrons provide access to economic or political resources, while clients offer loyalty, support, or specific services.

Several key features characterize patronal politics:

1. Informal channels of interaction. Formal institutions do not hold the same significance in patronal systems as they do in developed democracies, since patronal networks by definition are informal, and based on personalized exchanges (Hale, 2015).
2. Hierarchical structure. Relationships between patrons and clients are inherently unequal, with patrons controlling critical resources (financial, political, or social) and clients depending on their distribution (Geddes & Neto, 1992).
3. Personalization of power. Decisions are often based on personal connections and loyalty rather than institutional or rational mechanisms.

In the context of economic policy, patronal networks frequently form around key industries such as mining, construction, or agriculture (Pereira & Melo, 2024). In Brazil, for example, construction companies like Odebrecht have used their resources to influence political processes through illegal campaign financing and shadow agreements (Garay et al., 2018). These networks thrive on “backroom” negotiations for public contracts and the formation of “cartels” — alliances between corporations and politicians aimed at maximizing mutual benefits.

High social inequality and weak institutional oversight are simultaneously the consequences and reinforcing factors for patronal networks. Income inequality creates situation, when large strata of society become dependent on government help, and those with access to resources can use their access to resources to effectively ‘buy’ loyalty (Avritzer, 2020). Thus, regional elites use these networks to access federal resources, consolidating their power (Leal, 2009). In wealthier regions, patrons are often linked to large corporations and political parties (Samuels, 2003), while in poorer regions, clients may include populations dependent on social programs or political intermediaries (Power & Taylor, 2011).

Corruption is an integral part of patronal politics, serving as a mechanism for re-allocating resources outside formal institutions (Hale, 2015). For instance, the Lava Jato (Car Wash) operation revealed how large-scale corruption in public contracts and campaign financing sustains patronal networks in Brazil. This scandal exposed the central role of patronal relations in the country’s political system.

Brazil as a Patronal State

Throughout its history, Brazil has exhibited characteristics of a political system dominated by patronal networks (Leal, 2009). These networks, built on the interdependence of elites, state institutions, and economic interests, permeate all levels of governance — from municipal to federal (Peters & Filgueiras, 2022).

Many researchers view patronalism as the result of a failed modernization attempt. Within this paradigm, it is appropriate to consider patronal politics as a continuation of premodern practices that reproduce themselves in the gaps of modernity. In Brazil, the roots of these practices trace back to the era of *coronelismo* — a system in which political power was concentrated in the hands of large landowners (*coronéis*), who not only controlled the region’s economic life but also acted as intermediaries between the colonial government and the local population (Dowbor, 2009).

This system turned out to be remarkably resilient. Even after Brazil gained independence, it served as the basis of political power in the country with little change until the mid-20th century. Within this system, landowners provided clients with access to land, jobs, and social services in exchange for political loyalty (Dowbor, 2009).

Over time, this model evolved, adapting to new conditions, but its core features persisted. Modern Brazilian patronal networks revolve around large corporations and exploit their political connections to exchange resources for loyalty.

The country’s federal structure, with high levels of autonomy for states and municipalities, allows for the formation of patronal domains with their own patronal pyramids (Peters & Filgueiras, 2022). These structures can then leverage control over resources to strengthen their influence at the federal level via corrupt schemes, such as the “shadow funds” (*caixa dois*) used to finance electoral campaigns (Burdett, 2015).

The consequences of patronal politics can be seen, among other things, in regional differences between economically developed southern states and less developed north-eastern regions (Dowbor, 2020).

Patronal Networks and Economic Elites

Large economic groups form the nucleus of patronal networks (Hale, 2015). Examples include construction companies (Odebrecht), agricultural conglomerates (JBS), and mining companies. These corporations act as patrons, providing financial support to politicians and parties in exchange for contracts, tax incentives, and political protection.

Thus, corporate interests merge with political ones, creating a system of mutual dependence. Corruption and “back-door deals” are their general *modus operandi*. For instance, revelations from the Lava Jato operation showed how corporations used “shadow funds” to finance political campaigns (Garay et al., 2018; Campos & Giovannoni, 2007).

This mutual dependency and interpenetration between political and economic spheres affect the way every branch of power operates in Brazil. For example, Brazilian political parties operate not as ideological platforms but as tools for resource distribution (Pereira & Melo, 2024). Coalition politics, which dominates in Brazil, amplifies the role of patronal relations, as it requires constant allocation of posts and resources among coalition members.

Patronal politics significantly affects the quality of governance, reducing transparency and accountability of governing bodies. This can be seen, for example, in the way contracts are allocated through shadow schemes (Geddes & Neto, 1992). We’ve seen, for example, how shadow deals influenced the management of the Amazon forests (Fearnside, 2021). Resources are redistributed based on political loyalty, as was the case with many social programs introduced by Lula (Hunter & Power, 2008). Hunter and Power show in their paper how preferential treatment of clienteles by their patrons exacerbated regional disparities in Brazil.

In the remainder of the paper, we will analyze the cases of Odebrecht and JBS as key examples of patronal networks.

Case Analysis: Odebrecht and JBS

1. Operation Lava Jato and Odebrecht

Operation Lava Jato (Car Wash) became one of the largest corruption investigations in Brazil’s history, with revelations involving the company Odebrecht playing a central role. Odebrecht, one of Brazil’s largest construction firms with an international presence and strong political connections, was found to have systematically bribed officials and politicians, leveraging corrupt schemes to secure lucrative contracts with government agencies and major corporations.

A key element of this scheme was the use of a so-called “shadow accounting system” (Caixa Dois), through which illicit funds were directed toward financing political parties, candidates, and various political projects. This mechanism, designed to obscure the origins of the funds, was used to ensure the loyalty of politicians and government officials, enabling Odebrecht to secure favorable contracts in public tenders.

The investigation implicated around 100 politicians and business leaders, including former presidents, governors, and high-ranking officials (Garay et al., 2018). These revelations highlighted how patronage networks function in Brazil, with large corporations

like Odebrecht interacting with political elites to achieve political and economic advantages.

Testimonies from key figures in the company indicated that funding primarily flowed through the shadow accounting system, with decisions regarding illegal payments often made by the Workers' Party.

Emílio Odebrecht, a former CEO of the company, stated in a plea deal with Brazil's Federal Prosecutor's Office that the exchange of favors between politicians and businesses had been "institutionalized" for over 30 years. "In Brazil, this is not new; it has been happening for 30 years. It has become normalized due to the number of involved parties," he said. Odebrecht also emphasized that the company's executives were sent abroad to face real competition, as Brazil's engineering and competitive practices were underdeveloped.

Corruption was so casual for Odebrecht, that the company even had a special division dedicated to maintain regular contact with politicians across the political spectrum, with a shadow accounting system and a Caribbean bank to run those schemes through.

For Brazil's political system, this case exemplifies how patronage (the use of corrupt practices by shadow elites to consolidate influence) is deeply integrated into formal political structures (Junior, 2020). The system of political lobbying and corruption was so pervasive that it extended across federal, regional, and municipal levels of government, reinforcing the hypothesis of patronage networks operating at all levels of governance and collaborating with private interests.

2. JBS and Its Role in Political Lobbying

JBS, the world's largest meat producer and one of Brazil's largest private food companies, was revealed in 2017 to have actively financed political campaigns and lobbied politicians to secure its corporate interests. This mechanism allowed JBS to conceal the origins of its financial contributions and bribes while ensuring their targeted distribution. The caixa dois system was integral to maintaining JBS's vast network of political allies, funding campaigns, and securing legislative support. As part of a plea deal, JBS executives disclosed that approximately 600 million reais had been illegally funneled through this shadow accounting system to 1,829 candidates across 28 political parties (Garay et al., 2018).

The impact of these illicit payments was staggering: JBS-backed candidates secured 179 seats in the Federal Chamber of Deputies, 28 in the Senate, and 16 governorships (Power & Taylor, 2011). By establishing political dominance at multiple levels of government, JBS ensured favorable treatment in regulatory frameworks, tax incentives, and lucrative contracts. One notorious example involved the governors of Mato Grosso and Goiás, who were accused of receiving millions in illicit funds to facilitate tax benefits for JBS operations.

JBS also used caixa dois to provide additional benefits to politicians outside formal campaign donations. For instance, the company covered private expenses for key political figures, including luxury goods, travel, and other perks, as part of its strategy to deepen loyalty (Garay et al., 2018). In one instance, it was revealed that JBS executives offered hidden payouts to officials in exchange for regulatory changes that directly benefited the company's export business.

A striking example of JBS's reach was the confession of former Bolsonaro government minister Onyx Lorenzoni, who admitted to receiving 300,000 reais from JBS in unregistered campaign funds. Lorenzoni's case highlighted how the company's caixa dois

system infiltrated all levels of governance, influencing not only federal legislation but also municipal and state policies.

Beyond individual politicians, JBS leveraged its shadow accounting system to maintain relationships with entire political parties, including the Workers' Party (PT), the Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB), and the Progressive Party (PP). These parties received significant financial backing in exchange for policy outcomes that benefited JBS, such as reduced export taxes and favorable credit lines from public banks like BNDES (Brazilian Development Bank). The company reportedly received over 10 billion reais in BNDES loans, much of which was facilitated by politicians and intermediaries within its patronage network.

The JBS scandal also implicated the company in systemic abuses of regulatory and oversight bodies. The company used its financial power to delay investigations, influence inspections, and weaken enforcement mechanisms. For example, JBS executives admitted to bribing officials at Brazil's Ministry of Agriculture to bypass health and safety regulations, enabling the company to export substandard meat products to international markets. These payments, often channeled through intermediaries or the *caixa dois*, underscored the broader implications of JBS's corrupt practices for public health and Brazil's reputation abroad. Another example is even more striking — while the investigation in JBS was still unfolding, journalists revealed that one of the senior prosecutors working on the case was simultaneously working for the law firm that defended JBS (Ferreira et al., 2017; Paula & Moura, 2021). Which goes to show how pervasiveness the JBS influence was.

The fallout from the JBS scandal revealed how deeply embedded corruption was in Brazil's political and economic systems. While the company portrayed itself as a global leader in agribusiness, its reliance on *caixa dois* and patronage networks exposed the systemic vulnerabilities within Brazil's governance. The case highlighted the extent to which private corporations could manipulate public institutions, redirecting resources to elite interests at the expense of broader societal welfare.

3. Odebrecht and JBS in Brazilian political patronage

Both Odebrecht and JBS played an important role in political lobbying and corruption in Brazil, showing how conservation networks can work at different levels of economy and politics. Although these companies work in various sectors (construction and meat industries), they planned equal ways to strengthen their positions within the political system.

Both companies relied on “shadow” financial flows to achieve their objectives. Odebrecht used political connections to secure contracts with state companies, while JBS supported candidates, enabling the company to extend its influence over legislative bodies and local and federal elections. These actions illustrate how large corporations can become part of a covert political system in which resources are exchanged for political loyalty and influence.

Revelations involving these two companies demonstrate the intertwining of business and politics in Brazil, creating resilient patronage networks that shape public policy and governance.

Discussion

The investigation into corruption involving Odebrecht and JBS vividly demonstrates how patronal networks shape Brazil's political landscape, encompassing all political parties and other political institutions in the country.

The examined case illustrates how corporate interests, intertwined with political elites, create a system of patronal politics that permeates all levels of government — federal, regional, and municipal. Both scandals are linked to the deliberate use of financial resources to influence political processes, and their analysis provides valuable insights into the nature of patronal politics in Brazil, as well as its implications for governance, democratic accountability, and the functioning of state institutions.

1. Patronal Networks and Political Control

In a system of patronal politics, corrupt exchanges become a critical link between economic elites and politicians. These exchanges can take the form of campaign donations, bribes, and illegal payments. In the case of Odebrecht, the company used a shadow accounting system (*Caixa Dois*) to funnel over \$788 million in bribes to politicians across various parties and levels of government between 2006 and 2014. This mechanism not only ensured politicians' loyalty to Odebrecht but also solidified the company's dominant position in securing government contracts (Garay et al., 2018).

Similarly, JBS employed a systematic strategy of bribing politicians to secure favorable regulatory conditions, tax incentives, and government contracts, enabling the company to expand its operations both domestically and internationally. JBS's financing of over 1,800 political candidates demonstrates how deeply these networks are embedded in the electoral process (Batista, 2017).

The scale of political influence exerted by Odebrecht and JBS highlights a key feature of patronal politics in Brazil: the close integration of private sector interests with public governance (Pereira & Melo, 2024). In both cases, politicians became dependent on resources provided by large corporations to fund their campaigns and ensure their political survival. This mutually beneficial relationship between business elites and politicians shows that patronal networks are not merely transactional mechanisms but form symbiotic relationships that reinforce the status quo.

2. Economic Influence and Control Over Legislation

One of the most striking aspects of the Odebrecht and JBS scandals is the extent to which corporate financial power shapes legislative processes. In Brazil, both companies used their economic leverage to influence policy decisions, circumvent regulations, and secure favorable conditions for their operations.

For example, testimony from Odebrecht employees about the company's lobbying efforts, including direct payments to politicians in exchange for favorable legislation and government contracts, illustrates how large businesses embed themselves in legislative processes to advance their interests.

César Rocha, former financial manager at Odebrecht, described the process as follows:

“We would receive a request for legislative support (we had consultants who handled this). The matter was forwarded to the leadership of Odebrecht Transport and the company's legal department. Benedito Júnior and Paulo Cesena would determine whether the issue was of interest to the company or had tax implications requiring protection. If protection was needed, we used all industry associations to implement it. Usually, this was done within legal frameworks.”

Similarly, JBS used its economic influence to sustain patronal networks. The company financed the election of federal deputies, senators, and governors from various parties, allowing it to shape the political agenda in its favor. For instance, Joesley and Wesley Batista, the owners of JBS, admitted in a plea bargain to paying approximately \$180

million in bribes to numerous Brazilian officials, including those overseeing state-backed financing and food safety regulators (Food Safety News, 2023).

Thus, it is evident that business influence on politics extends beyond simple campaign financing and includes manipulating legislative processes for economic gain.

3. Cross-Level Influence: Federal, Regional, and Municipal

Both companies actively engaged not only with federal authorities but also with regional and municipal officials.

In the case of Odebrecht, bribery schemes extended beyond national institutions to include governors, mayors, and municipal councils. This highlights the localized nature of patronal networks, where resources are distributed across various levels of government to ensure loyalty and eliminate potential threats to elite control. For example, Odebrecht paid \$349 million in bribes to secure contracts in 12 countries, with a significant portion going to local officials in Brazil.

JBS employed similar mechanisms. Its financing of regional and municipal campaigns, as well as its support for local politicians, allowed the company to control the allocation of land, permits, and subsidies, which were critical to its operations, particularly in the meatpacking and agricultural sectors.

4. Shadow Accounting and Covert Financial Flows

Both cases demonstrate the key role of shadow accounting systems (Caixa Dois) in the functioning of patronal networks. These systems provide a mechanism for concealing illicit financial flows, enabling businesses to maintain political influence without attracting attention.

For Odebrecht, this meant masking the origin of funds to facilitate secret payments to politicians. JBS used a similar system, maintaining a “bribery ledger” that recorded payments made to politicians across the country (Medeiros, 2021).

5. Impact on Governance and Democracy

The consequences of patronal politics undermine the principles of transparency, accountability, and equitable governance (Power & Taylor, 2011).

A 2018 Latinobarómetro survey found that 67% of Brazilians believed corruption had increased following these scandals. Patronal politics and its consequences lead to deep disillusionment among voters and a general erosion of trust in democratic institutions.

However, addressing this situation is highly challenging, as those responsible for implementing anti-corruption reforms are often the very beneficiaries of corruption. This creates a vicious cycle where systemic change becomes increasingly difficult to achieve.

Conclusion

The analysis of the Odebrecht and JBS scandals outlined in this paper offers valuable insight into the mechanisms of patronal politics and their devastating impact on Brazil’s political and economic systems. These cases reveal a common, self-reinforcing pattern: the institutionalization of corruption through informal networks that intertwine economic elites with political power. Both Odebrecht and JBS exemplify how patronal networks exploit financial leverage to secure favorable policies and contracts.

The Odebrecht and JBS scandals highlight how corruption becomes normalized within a system where patronal networks thrive. The use of caixa dois (shadow accounting) and offshore accounts to funnel bribes illustrates how these networks bypass formal

institutions, creating a de facto parallel system of governance that operates in the shadows.

Three factors stand out in the way these companies operate:

1. The sheer scale of the sums allocated for bribes — we are talking about billions of dollars. In one case alone, Odebrecht admitted to paying \$788 million in bribes, with a significant portion directed to Brazilian politicians, including high-ranking officials and political parties.

2. The scope of corruption. The extent of these networks is staggering, with even the team prosecuting JBS found to include individuals connected to the company's legal defense, highlighting the pervasive reach of these networks.

3. The routinization of corruption. For these companies, corruption was not an exception but a standard practice. Odebrecht, for example, had a dedicated department to manage bribes to politicians, and its top management openly admitted how common and widespread these practices were.

These findings reveal the symbiotic relationship between business and politics in Brazil, where corporate interests are deeply intertwined with political power. This relationship not only facilitates the accumulation of wealth and influence by a select group of elites but also undermines democratic processes and perpetuates inequality. The widespread influence of patronal networks, as demonstrated by Odebrecht and JBS, poses a significant challenge to the rule of law and accountability in Brazil, showing that corruption is not just an individual wrongdoing but a deeply ingrained system that requires systemic reforms.

From a broader theoretical perspective, the Odebrecht and JBS cases provide valuable insights into the mechanisms of patronal politics and their implications for governance, democracy, and development. These cases illustrate how informal networks distort governance structures, limit political competition, and hinder economic growth. The use of shadow funds and illicit lobbying to influence policy decisions is not unique to Brazil but is a common feature of patronal systems in countries with weak institutions and high inequality (Hale, 2015). Brazil's experience serves as a cautionary tale for other nations facing similar challenges, highlighting the dangers of unregulated intersections between business and politics.

In conclusion, the Odebrecht and JBS scandals are emblematic of the broader issue of patronage in modern political systems. These cases underscore the need for comprehensive reforms to address the systemic nature of corruption, promote political transparency, and safeguard democratic processes. Without such reforms, the cycle of corruption and patronage will continue to undermine both political stability and economic equity, not only in Brazil but potentially in other countries as well. By expanding Hale's framework to include shadow accounting and offshore accounts, this paper provides a new theoretical lens for analyzing corruption in developing democracies. This contributes to the broader literature on patronal politics, state capture, and informal governance, offering a more comprehensive understanding of how corruption operates in different contexts. For example, the use of shadow accounting systems and offshore accounts is not unique to Brazil but is a common feature of corruption networks in countries like Nigeria, India and many Post-Soviet states. These similarities underscore the global nature of corruption and the need for cross-country comparisons in corruption studies, which calls for further studies in this area.

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ПАТРОНАЛЬНЫЕ СЕТИ В БРАЗИЛИИ: КЕЙСЫ ODEBRECHT И JBS

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Аннотация. Данное исследование рассматривает два ключевых коррупционных скандала в Бразилии — дела Odebrecht и JBS — с целью анализа функционирования патрональных сетей и их влияния на политическую и экономическую системы страны. В исследовании используется теоретическую модель Г. Хейла для демонстрации того, как неформальные сети экономической и политической элит поддерживают системную коррупцию посредством таких механизмов, как теневые системы бухгалтерского учёта (*caixa dois*), офшорные финансовые потоки, и специализированные государственные органы, используемые для дачи взяток. Выделены три ключевых механизма патрональных сетей. Эти механизмы позволяют корпорациям оказывать значительное влияние на политические процессы, усугубляя неравенство и подрывая доверие общества к институтам. Выводы исследования выходят за рамки Бразилии, предлагая ценные инсайты для других стран, сталкивающихся с системной коррупцией и слабыми институтами. Дело Odebrecht, раскрытое в ходе расследования Lava Jato («Автомойка»), и скандал с JBS демонстрируют, как крупные корпорации могут институционализировать коррупцию для получения выгодных контрактов, влияния на политику и поддержания лояльности властей. Очевидно, что эти случаи иллюстрируют симбиотическую связь между бизнесом и политикой, где финансовые ресурсы обмениваются на политические предпочтения. Это подрывает прозрачность, подотчетность и демократическое управление. Работа предлагает дорожную карту для борьбы с коррупцией и укрепления демократической подотчетности в развивающихся демократиях.

Ключевые слова: патрональные сети, патрональная политика, дело Odebrecht, дело JBS, механизмы патрональных сетей, коррупция.

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