Electoral Instruments of a Party Hegemony: Recent Developments and the Limits of the Unted Russia Party’s Monopoly | South-Russian Journal of Social Sciences
Electoral Instruments of a Party Hegemony: Recent Developments and the Limits of the Unted Russia Party’s Monopoly
Vol. 21 (2020) No. 1, Public Administration and Governance
Vol. 21 (2020) No. 1
Public Administration and Governance

Electoral Instruments of a Party Hegemony: Recent Developments and the Limits of the Unted Russia Party’s Monopoly

Martynov M.V.
Surgut State University
ORCID ID 0000-0002-8245-7359
Markhinin V.V.
Surgut State University
ORCID ID 0000-0001-5024-2452
PDF (Russian)
https://doi.org/10.31429/26190567-21-1-86-103
https://doi.org/10.31429/26190567-21-1-86-103

How to Cite Array

Martynov M.V., Markhinin V.V. (2020) Electoral Instruments of a Party Hegemony: Recent Developments and the Limits of the Unted Russia Party’s Monopoly. South-Russian Journal of Social Sciences, 21 (1), pp. 86-103. DOI: 10.31429/26190567-21-1-86-103 (In Russian)
Submission Date 2019-11-03
Accepted Date 2019-12-12
Published Date 2020-03-30

Copyright (c) 2020 Михаил Юрьевич Мартынов, Василий Васильевич Мархинин

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Abstract

The article discusses the impact of the electoral system, in the form of legal rules governing elections, on the state of the party system in the regional and local dimension. The policy implications of reforming electoral systems are analyzed by means of quantitative analysis. The subject of research is identification of limits of strength of political hegemony of “United Russia” in electoral space of national, regional and local level. The main instrument of this hegemony to date has been the establishment of representative institutions, whose composition is distorted in relation to the real structure of the political preferences of the electorate through the selection of combinations of majoritarian and proportional elements of the electoral system, providing the most comfortable conditions of competition for the dominant party and the least convenient conditions for its opponents. Practices such as the widespread adoption of non-electoral caucuses and the strategy of isolating opponents as much as possible from the allocation of any political resources are subject to the same objectives. On the material of electoral statistics, the article gives an assessment of the political results of the reforms of electoral and party legislation on the eve of the 2016 elections, and takes the experience of forecasting the results of the implementation of the new reform program formed by the “party of power” by 2019.

Keywords

party system, electoral system, political pluralism, political competition, local and regional political process

Acknowledgements

The article was prepared as part of a State research assignment from the Department of Education and Youth Policy of the Khanty-­Mansi Autonomous Region.

References

  1. Borisov, I. B. (2016). Vybory: doveriye, otvetstvennost', grazhdanskiy dialog [Elections: Trust, Responsibility, Civil Dialogue]. Izbiratel'noye zakonodatel'stvo i praktika [Electoral Legislation and Practice], 3, 28–30.
  2. Burchard, S. (2013). You Have to Know Where to Look in Order to Find It: Competitiveness in Botswana’s Dominant Party System. Government and Opposition, 48(1), 115–116.
  3. Buzin, A. Yu. (2016). Osnovnyye iz'yany rossiyskogo izbiratel'nogo zakonodatel'stva [The Main Flaws in the Russian Electoral Law]. Grazhdanin, vybory, vlast'. Nauchno-analiticheskiy zhurnal [Citizen Elections Authority. Scientific and Analytical Journal], 4, 34–39.
  4. Fedotov, M. (2016). Konsolidirovannyy doklad Monitoringovoy rabochey gruppy Soveta pri Prezidente Rossiyskoy Federatsii po razvitiyu grazhdanskogo obshchestva i pravam cheloveka na parlamentskikh vyborakh v 2016 godu [Consolidated Report of the Monitoring Working Group of the Presidential Council on the Development of Civil Society and Human Rights in the 2016 Parliamentary Elections]. Retrieved from http://president-sovet.ru/files/59/c8/59c837f7f22949fa72d085f8c58487ff.pdf
  5. Frye, T. Reuter, O., Szakonyi, D. (2012). Political Machines at Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in the Workplace. APSA 2012 Annual Meeting Paper. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2110201
  6. Galimova, M. V. (2019). V Kremle obsudili vozvrashcheniye izbiratel'nykh blokov s povyshennym bar'yerom [The Kremlin Discussed the Return of Electoral Blocs with an Increased Barrier]. Retrieved from https://www.rbc.ru/politics/07/11/2019/5dc1de8e9a7947f72a367fbd
  7. Golosov, G. (2013). Machine Politics: The Concept and Its Implications for Post-Soviet Studies. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 21(4), 459–480.
  8. Golosov, G. V. (2005). Sfabrikovannoye bol'shinstvo: konversiya golosov v mesta na dumskikh vyborakh 2003 g. [A Manufactured Majority: Vote-Seat Conversion in the 2003 Duma Elections]. Polis [Polis. Political Studies], 1, 108–119.
  9. Golosov, G. V. (2010). The Effective Number of Parties: A New Approach. Party Politics, 16(2), 171–192
  10. Izmeneniya, predlagayemyye k vneseniyu v proyekt Kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii o vyborakh i referendumakh [Changes Proposed to be Introduced into the Draft Code of the Russian Federation on Elections and Referenda]. Retrieved from http://www.rfsv.ru/page/izmeneniia-predlagaemye-k-vneseniiu-v-proekt-kodeks-rossiiskoi-federatsii-o-vyborakh-i-referendumakh
  11. Korgunyuk, Y. (2017). Classification of Russian Parties. Russian Politics, 2, 255–286.
  12. Korgunyuk, Y., Cameron R., Shpagin, S. (2018). Party Reforms and the Unbalancing of the Cleavage Structure in Russian Regional Elections, 2012–2015. Europe-Asia Studies, 70, 1–27.
  13. Kynev, A. V., Lyubarev, A. Ye. (2019). Itogi golosovaniya i rezul'taty vyborov 8 sentyabrya 2019 goda [Voting Results and Election Results on September 8, 2019]. Retrieved from http://liberal.ru/upload/files/Vibory_2019.Itogi.pdf
  14. Laakso, M., Taagepera, R. (1979). “Effective” Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 12(1), 3–27.
  15. Lyubarev, A. (2019). Rekomendatsiya chlenov Nauchno-ekspertnogo soveta pri TSIK Rossii [Recommendations of Science Expertise Board at Central Electoral Committee of Russian Federation]. Retrieved from https://echo.msk.ru/blog/lyubarev/2472749-echo/
  16. Lyubarev, A. Ye. (2013). Proportsional'naya i smeshannaya izbiratel'nyye sistemy na regional'nykh i munitsipal'nykh vyborakh v Rossiyskoy Federatsii: problemy «sfabrikovannogo bol'shinstva» [Proportional and Mixed Electoral Systems in Regional and Municipal Elections in the Russian Federation: Problems of the “Fabricated Majority”]. Yuridicheskiye issledovaniya [Legal Research], 8, 65–118.
  17. Lyubarev, A. Ye. (2013). Sootvetstvuyut li rossiyskiye vybory svoyemu konstitutsionnomu prednaznacheniyu [Are Russian Elections Consistent with their Constitutional Mission?]. Pravo i politika [Law and Politics], 13, 1903–1915.
  18. Lyubarev, A. Ye. (2016). Nedostatki izbiratel'nogo zakonodatel'stva i yego kodifikatsiya, [Shortcomings of the Electoral Law and Its Codification]. Grazhdanin, vybory, vlast'. Nauchno-analiticheskiy zhurnal [Citizen, Elections, Authority. Scientific and Analytical Journal], 4, 114–117.
  19. Markhinin, V. V., Purtova, V. S., Ushakova, N. V. (2019). Regional'nyye partiynyye i izbiratel'nyye sistemy: sostoyaniye i perspektivy [Regional Party and Electoral Systems: State and Prospects]. Kurganskiy Dom pechati.
  20. Melkon'yants, G. A. (2016). Elektronnaya demokratiya — sredstvo povysheniya doveriya k vyboram. [E-Democracy is a Means of Increasing Confidence in Elections]. Grazhdanin, vybory, vlast'. Nauchno-analiticheskiy zhurnal [Citizen, Elections, Authority. Scientific and Analytical Journal], 4, 120–123.
  21. Nauchno-prakticheskaya konferentsiya “Izbiratel'naya sistema Rossii: opyt formirovaniya i perspektivy razvitiya” [Scientific and Practical Conference “Electoral System of Russia: Experience and Future Perspectives”] (2016). Retrieved from http://www.cikrf.ru/news/cec/23113/
  22. Pamfilova, E. A. (2016). Glavnaya zadacha organizatorov vyborov — dobit'sya doveriya izbirateley [The Main Task of the Election Organizers is to Achieve the Confidence of Voters]. Grazhdanin, vybory, vlast'. Nauchno-analiticheskiy zhurnal [Citizen Elections Authority. Scientific and Analytical Journal], 4, 6–13.
  23. Panov, P, Ross, C. (2013). Patterns of Electoral Contestation in Russian Regional Assemblies: Between Competitive and Hegemonic Authoritarianism. Demokratizatsiya. The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 21, 369–400.
  24. Ray, D., Havick, J. (1981). A Longitudinal Analysis of Party Competition in State Legislative Elections. American Journal of Political Science, 25, 119–128.
  25. Reuter, O. J., Buckley N., Shubenkova, A., Garifullina, G. (2016). Local Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: An Elite-Based Theory with Evidence from Russian Mayoral Elections. Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2643773.
  26. Ross, C., Turovsky, R (2015). Centralized but Fragmented: The Regional Dimension of “Russia’s Party of Power”. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, 23(2), 205–223.
  27. Sostoyalos' zasedaniye Nauchno-ekspertnogo soveta pri TSIK Rossii [A meeting of the Scientific Expert Council at the CEC of Russia Took Place] (2019). Retrieved from http://cikrf.ru/news/cec/44639/?fbclid=IwAR1US_pn5rFe1w-p0ubWLL7sGSKBl2cArmXGQu20xUfSCnvcQdCgTmqI7cs
  28. Vybory v Gosdumu-2021 s preobladaniyem odnomandatnykh okrugov: kakim mozhet byt' regional'nyy razrez pri skheme 25:75 v pol'zu odnomandatnikov? [Duma Elections-2021 under Majoritarian System 25:75 — What the Result Will Look Like]. Retrieved from http://www.isepr.ru/upload/iblock/4e8/vibory_v_dumu_2021.pdf