Abstract
This study examines two seminal corruption scandals in Brazil – that of Odebrecht and JBS – with a view to analyzing the functioning of patronal networks and their implications for the country's political and economic systems. The present study employs Henry Hale's theoretical framework to demonstrate how informal networks of economic and political elites perpetuate systemic corruption through mechanisms such as shadow accounting systems (caixa dois), offshore financial flows, and dedicated bribery departments. It is interesting to note that the Odebrecht case, which emerged from the Lava Jato (Car Wash) investigation, and the JBS scandal, appear to demonstrate how large corporations may sometimes find ways to institutionalize corruption in order to secure lucrative contracts, influence policymaking, and maintain political loyalty. It is evident from these cases that there is a symbiotic relationship between business and politics, whereby financial resources are exchanged for political favors. This has the effect of undermining transparency, accountability, and democratic governance. The study identifies three key mechanisms of patronal networks. Firstly, the use of shadow accounting to conceal illicit financial flows is identified. Secondly, the reliance on offshore accounts to evade detection is identified. Thirdly, the institutionalization of corruption at the level of corporations via the creation of specialized departments to manage bribery operations. It is evident that these mechanisms empower corporations to wield considerable influence over political processes, thereby perpetuating inequality and eroding public trust in institutions. The findings extend beyond the Brazilian context, providing a valuable source of insight for other countries grappling with systemic corruption and weak institutions. It is hoped that the paper will be of some contribution to the global discourse on corruption, by offering a perspective on the systemic nature of the problem and the need for comprehensive reforms. The integration of empirical analysis with theoretical insights is a distinctive feature of the present study, and it contributes to the advancement of understanding of patronal politics, corruption, and informal governance. The study offers a roadmap for addressing corruption and promoting democratic accountability in developing democracies.Keywords
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